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Product Quality Choice, Competition and Supply Chain
Design.
We explore the interplay between product design choices and their effect on the supply chain
transactions. A large number of industrial business-to-business transactions indicates that
product design choices, and the definition of the overall product performance (quality), is
relying on “off the shelf” standardized components, and it influences the component pricing.
We develop a normative model that highlights the drivers for the different industrial settings
and we consider end product markets with quality sensitive heterogenous consumers (vertical
differentiation).
We find that depending on the industry concentration at the different tiers of the supply
chain, the timing of the product definition by the OEM has a substantial effect on the
transacting firms payoff, as well as on other relevant metrics (total supply chain profits,
social welfare). By examining the potential action sequences across the transacting firms,
we identify the incentives for each firm to accomplish a decision earlier or later in the strategic
interaction. Interestingly, the standard notion of the “leader” advantage in the transaction
does not hold always, due to the indirect effect of the component cost on the end-product
market, through the indirect link between the product performance and the total market
served. Therefore, the OEM may benefit more from finalizing the end product specifications
based on known component costs. Along similar lines, the supplier may benefit from a
“follower” position in the sequence of decisions. Finally, the severity of competition in any
of the two tiers may be diluted by a specific sequence, depending on the available information
at the monopolistic tier.
KEYWORDS: VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION, SUPPLY CHAIN TRANSACTIONS, PRODUCT DE-
SIGN
1. Introduction
The Apple iPod has been a resounding success by, practically, any financial measure. Its
sleek design, high quality audio, and compact size enabled Apple to revamp the market for
portable digital music players in late 2001. After establishing a firm foothold in the market,
iPod sales skyrocketed to 10.4 million units in 2004 and obtained an overall market share
for U.S. portable digital music players of over 80%, making Apple the third best performing
stock in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index in 2004 (Guglielmo, 2004). However, the popular
business press placed far less attention on the fact that the original iPod would not have been
possible without the advent of an 1.8 inch miniature hard-drive, designed and manufactured
by Toshiba Corporation.
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The miniature hard drive was critical to the original iPod’s small size and functionality
and represented an estimated 50% of its total variable cost (Sherman, 2002). Designing
around this key component, Apple engineers determined the overall performance and the
design features of the iPod through their focus on dimensions that affected the end-consumer
perception, like the audio performance, the power utilization, and the product size. More
specifically, Apple made several critical design choices (especially with respect to the product
size) and shared them with Toshiba’s engineers before finalizing the per-unit cost for the hard
drives. At the same time, Toshiba quoted a price for the hard drives that allowed Apple to
retain the overall product (development and manufacturing) cost at levels that supported
their retail price targets. Despite the fact that Toshiba enjoyed monopolistic power through
their technological intellectual property (their ability to produce a reliable miniature hard
drive), they did not abuse their power by demanding high profit margins. Instead, Toshiba
set a price for the hard drive that provided them with a modest profit margin, perhaps in
anticipation of a large market potential for the iPod where they would make more money
based on the high sales volumes. In hindsight, this appears to have been a smart move on
Toshiba’s part as the success of the iPod resulted in substantial financial benefits for both
companies.
The interplay between the product design decisions and the supply chain transaction
relationships between an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and a key component
supplier is certainly not unique to Apple’s development of the original iPod. In numer-
ous other instances, OEMs share design specifications with component suppliers before the
component prices are set. Many industrial settings exhibit such interactions; e.g. Toyota
finalized the key quality requirements of the Prius (their first hybrid engine car model) before
negotiating with Panasonic on the price of the rechargeable batteries needed to make the
product work (Liker, 2004). At the same time, we also encounter the alternative timing of
decisions: the downstream OEMs account for finalized price levels of a key product compo-
nent before freezing the design specifications and refining the key quality dimensions of the
end-product. As an example, PC manufacturers wait until the core processor manufacturers,
Intel or AMD, announce their prices for the latest microprocessor before determining the
quality features of their product offerings such as the amount of memory, hard drive size,
type of external drives, etc. This intentional delay allows the OEMs to adjust their respec-
tive feature choices for the final product to be in line with observed consumer price ceilings
(e.g. $1000 for a consumer desktop computer; www.cnet.com).
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In this paper, we explore the effects of the timing of the product definition decision as
approximated by the sequence of firm actions on the product design choices along with the
ramifications on the supply chain. We explore how the timing of the final product’s design
quality choice (i.e. before or after negotiating the price of a key component) affects its price,
the performance quality of the final product, and the total demand served. We also analyze
the impact on the total (and the appropriation of) supply chain profits.
We seek to answer our research questions under various competition regimes for the com-
ponent and the end-product markets. We start with the base case of a monopoly-supplier,
monopoly-OEM setting, which we use as a benchmark (i.e. a single transaction specific to
its members). We then extend the model to incorporate the existence of competition in
either the supplier or the OEM market1. We assume that, whereas the end products can
be differentiated with respect to their quality performance and their price, the components
provided from the upstream market are standardized both with respect to their design and
the associated interfaces. Yet, the components hold a central role in the end-product func-
tionality and they are necessary to produce it. Still, without additional investment, the
components by themselves are useless to the final customer (e.g. memory chips can not
perform any standard computer operations without peripherals and software drivers). Thus,
when more than one supplier possesses the technology to produce such components, the
suppliers compete via their capacity decisions. Our assumption, albeit restrictive, captures
the essential effect of upstream competition (higher supply of components at lower prices
to the OEM), and follows from similar past literature (Tyagi 1999, Corbett and Karmarkar
2001, Carr and Karmarkar, 2005). As an extension to this literature, in our model, OEMs
in the end-product market may compete by differentiating their offering via the product
quality design choices, where a choice of higher quality incurs a higher per unit cost. We
posit that such industrial settings offer a more realistic structure to analyze and understand
the important strategic interactions.
We find that the timing at which the product definition decision (i.e. freezing the concept
and finalizing the design choices, Bhattacharya et al. 1998) takes place during the transaction
affects the profit distribution between the supply chain members along with the total supply
chain profit. Interestingly, the standard notion of the decision “leader,” in the game theoretic
sence, does not align with the profit outcomes. Under a monopoly-supplier, monopoly-OEM
transaction, the OEM benefits more from finalizing the product design after “locking” in
1The reason for this exclusive approach stems from our intention to isolate the effects of competition.
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the component price. Symmetrically, the supplier prefers to finalize component prices after
the OEM’s design decisions and investments are set, thus refraining from a first mover
advantage. These order preferences may change, however, if there exists competition at
either level of the supply chain. The presence of the quality choice may amplify the severity
of the upstream competition when the component prices are set before the product design
is fully determined. On the other end, competing OEMs exhibit misaligned incentives to
finalize their designs before the component prices are set. The later result introduces the
possibility that Moorthy’s (1988) observation that the simultaneous product introduction
has no difference to the sequential one, may require further research. These results appear
counterintuitive from a traditional economics perspective. They stem from the endogenous
determination of the total market due to the product quality choice and the existence of
heterogenous consumer preferences.
Overall, our findings bare managerial importance by illustrating the indirect coupling be-
tween product design decisions and the resulting supply chain transactions. In that light, we
echo Fine’s (1998) conjecture about the need for managers to consider product introduction
decisions along three dimensions: product design, process design and supply chain design.
Our study builds a comprehensive framework for assessing these interactions. In addition,
we obtain some social welfare implications that may be of interest to policy makers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in §2 we briefly review the relevant literature.
In §3 we introduce the model structure and discuss the basic premises. We establish the
importance of the sequence of decisions across the different firms in the supply chain in §4
for the monopoly-monopoly case. In §5 we extend this analysis to different supply chain
structures (oligopoly-monopoly in §5.1, and monopoly-duopoly in §5.2). We conclude our
presentation with the discussion of our results in §6. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2. Literature Review
Economic theory has traditionally reasoned that in non-differentiated products, price compe-
tition benefits the end-customer who enjoys the lowest prices (Bertrand competition). At the
same time, the same literature identifies differentiation in product attributes as a driver for
increased profits among competing companies. Differentiation has registered in economics
and management in two possible forms: vertical and horizontal differentiation. Vertical dif-
ferentiation occurs when all consumers appreciate equally the relative performance quality
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of a product but are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for a given quality (see Mussa
and Rosen 1978 and Tirole 1987 for discussions). A “lower” quality product may attract
consumers if offered at a low enough price but all consumers desire higher quality for the
same price. In vertical differentiation models, the concept of quality is assumed to be a one-
dimensional variable, although it may consist of multiple dimensions such as durability or
technical performance. Horizontal differentiation, in contrast, occurs when customers have
different tastes with respect to the product attributes (Hotelling, 1929). Hence, companies
introduce products with potentially different features, and share the market by attracting
those consumers that have tastes close to the offered product attributes.
In this paper, we focus on vertical differentiation where OEMs differentiate their products
along a commonly perceived performance dimension. We employ the basic structure of the
vertical differentiation model introduced by Moorthy (1984), for a monopoly setting, and
Moorthy’s (1988) later extension to a duopoly setting. These models assume the existence
of a convex (quadratic) cost of performance quality, and that the quality choice determines
the maximum market potential for a given price. We build upon Moorthy’s analysis to
account for the operational details of the OEM’s cost structure: the external component
costs and the internal investments in product performance quality comprise the per-unit
variable cost. In addition, we position the product design2 decisions within a supply chain
transaction setting, and we explicitly consider the strategic interactions between the end-
product market and its associated component market. In short, we extend the literature
by operationalizing the product design decisions (division between design investments and
component costs) and by explicitly capturing the strategic interactions of the supply chain
(transactions between the end-product and the supplier market).
While a number of studies have explored product differentiation (and the associated
issues of introduction, cannibalization etc.), much less has been said about the impact of
the supplier markets on the end-product market differentiation and vice versa. Recently,
Corbett and Karmarkar (2001) examined the impact of the within-tier competitiveness on the
adjacent tiers of a supply chain. They assume a multi-tier supply chain where each tier adds
components to obtain a non-differentiated end-product. Carr and Karmarkar (2005) extend
the analysis to general assembly networks. In the heart of these models, firms are assumed
to be price takers and to compete in capacities (Cournot competition). The total quantity
2From this point onwards we treat the concepts of “design performance” and “quality” choices as equiv-
alent, and thus we use the terms interchangeably.
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is sold to a homogenous end-customer market, expressed by the classic linear demand curve,
and it propagates upstream shaping the price in the supplier markets for a given number
of firms competing in each tier. They focus on the determinants of the market structure
(i.e. number of firms participating, entry decisions), demonstrating the subtle role of the
total number of competing firms to the end-product quantity and cost. However, their
assumption on the “commodity” nature of the end-product (perfect substitutes) limits the
generalization of the results. We claim that in most consumer markets, such a degree of
commoditization is rare, and firms compete by differentiating their offerings. Thus, extra
investment is undertaken to ensure that the product quality is higher than a competitor, or
that the price is lower.
Along similar lines, Majumder and Srinivasan (2006) extend the multi-tier analysis to
include contracting decisions across members of the different tiers. They retain the “com-
modity” assumption about the end-product and the intermediate components, and they
assume single-member tiers. Their results highlight the important role of the “leader” in the
supply chain, that is, the firm which first proposes contracts both to the upstream and the
downstream counterparts. In contrast, we do not focus on the formal contracting process,
given our account for product design choices (which to our knowledge are rarely contracted
upon, unless there is an explicit co-development agreement), and we allow for differentiated
end-products and heterogenous consumer preferences. Despite the different perspective, we
also observe that the order of decision making plays an important role in the distribution of
the supply chain profits. The consideration of the product performance as a decision variable
makes this role less intuitive however.
From a product development standpoint, Bhattacharya et al. (1998) explore the tim-
ing of the product definition during the product development process, given the lack of full
knowledge about the market potential. While they model the concept definition phase in
detail, they do not account for any outside components required for the realization of the de-
sign, and the respective impact of such transactions on the timing of the product definition.
We consider a higher level of decision making and explore how the timing of the product
definition decision affects the classic supply chain transactions, and the subsequent appro-
priation of the economic benefits. Krishnan and Ramachadran (2006) focus on the effect
of modular upgradable components on the innovation pace of industrial markets. Whereas
they account explicitly for the component performance and features, they do not consider
the strategic interaction between the upstream and downstream markets. Finally, Erat et
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al. (2006) analyze the effect of the upstream introduction decision of specialized processes
or high-tech components on the end product OEM profitability. They do not address the
end consumer market in detail, and they restrict their analysis to the adoption decisions by
the OEMs. Essentially, they do not assume explicit differentiation investments by the OEMs
apart from adopting the new component. In contrast, we focus on the design choices of the
OEMs and we allow for competition both at the upstream and downstream levels.
In summary, we explore the impact of the supplier market on the downstream competi-
tion with respect to prices and the degree of product differentiation. This setting allows us
to understand the cross tier linkages and design decision sequences in a quality-based, differ-
entiated market. Since we choose to address these issues at such a high level of analysis and
decision making, we make simplifying assumptions that aim to strike the right balance be-
tween mathematical abstraction and the real world phenomena. For example, as in Corbett
and Karmarkar (2001), we do not account for detailed inventory policies and/or the details
of the product development process that would render the model intractable and would not
necessarily reflect the strategic firm decisions.
3. Model Setup and Assumptions
Consider a two-tier supply chain structure consisting of a set of suppliers selling a single
standardized component to a set of OEMs3. The OEMs purchase the component from the
supplier market, manufacture the final product and subsequently sell it to a market of end-
consumers with heterogenous valuations regarding the end-product quality.
The end-user market is characterized by the different valuations that consumers place
on the performance levels of the products. Each consumer’s utility is u(θ, q, p) = θq − p,
where θ is the consumer’s valuation of a baseline product with a quality level of one, q the
product quality, and p the product price. We assume the consumers’ baseline valuations are
uniformly distributed across the [0, 1] line. This assumption is common in the literature when
the firm has little knowledge of the overall distribution of the consumers’ market potential.
We normalize the size of the total market to one4.
3Our results extend to any multi-tier supply chain with the tiers 2 to n supplying non-differentiated
products. The derivations follow Corbett and Karmarkar (2001). We choose to focus on the first 2 tiers as
a good proxy for the overall phenomenon.
4Our results continue to hold for cases when the size of the market is different than 1 but the notation
becomes unnecessarily burdensome.
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We define the OEM market through three key variables: (i) the index, i, of the OEM
(i = 1, 2)5; (ii) the corresponding final product prices (p1 and p2); and (iii) the quality
offering (q1 and q2), which describes the performance qualities offered to the end-consumers.
The variables qi represent individual firm quality choices, whereas the subscript i denotes
the rank, with respect to quality, of the firm (q1 ≤ q2). Thus, each firm’s total cost is
comprised of a wholesale price, w, for the standardized component, and the development
and manufacturing cost of quality ci = aq
2
i . The quadratic representation of the total cost
follows up the extant literature on product differentiation (see Moorthy 1984). The firm
specific ratio w
ci
determines the importance of the component cost in the overall firm cost
structure.
The supplier market sells a standardized (“commodity”) component, i.e. a component
with a well understood architecture and technology such as a memory chip or a hard disk
drive. Our assumption of a homogenous base of suppliers allows us to maintain tractability
and to characterize the effects on the end product offering(s) and the relative market size. In
addition, it retains the common observation that more intense upstream competition results
in lower prices. Two variables characterize the market: (i) the number of competing firms, n;
and (ii) the upstream wholesale price w determined through a market clearing mechanism.
We analyze the interactions that emerge across the supply chain tiers through a series of
extensions of the basic setup, which assume different competitive conditions in each tier.
4. The Role of the Decision Sequence
We start our analysis with the base case of a monopoly-supplier selling to a monopoly-
OEM (MM case). This setting, albeit stylized, is relevant because it points out right from
the beginning the importance of the timing of the product definition on the supply chain
transaction. From a modeling standpoint, we capture this timing through the sequence of
actions from the different decision makers. As our results verify, the decision sequence has a
significant impact on the resulting profits, both for the entire supply chain and the individual
firms. In later sections, we incorporate the effects of downstream and upstream competition.
Consider a monopolist OEM who uses a specific component for the end product. A
5Our effort is to explore different emerging equilibria for different structures of the two interacting markets.
The pricing equilibria of the OEM market extend to multiple companies through structures and mechanisms
described in Shaked and Sutton (1983). Yet closed form solutions for the equilibrium design choices are
intractable in settings with more than two competing firms.
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sole supplier sells the component at a wholesale price w. The component’s functional role is
important because without it, there can be no final product. At the same time the component
cannot perform as a full product (recall the memory microchip), therefore the OEM needs
to build a set of features around the component in order for an end consumer to appreciate
any utility. Thus, the OEM determines the performance quality q of the product design, and
the “retail” price p of the end product, while incurring a variable per-unit cost of aq2 + w.
Note that in the transaction, we assume a supplier powerful enough to avoid a completely
constrained decision (i.e. the supplier prices his/her component before the end-product price
is determined6).
We begin by adapting, to our setting, two basic results; the optimal decision making
of the vertically integrated supply chain and the optimal pricing game of a non-integrated
supply chain where the performance quality of the end-product is exogenous (i.e. a classic
“Stackelberg” game where the supplier sets the wholesale price). For the vertically integrated
supply chain, the OEM procures the component at the marginal cost of the supplier, which
is normalized to zero. Proposition 1 summarizes the result.
Proposition 1 (a) A two-tier, vertically integrated, supply chain offers a final product of
quality q = 1
3a
at a price of p = 2
9a





total market is served. (adapted from Moorthy 1984)
(b) For an exogenous quality level of q = 1
3a
, a two-tier, non-integrated, supply chain
offers a final product price of p = 5
18a









of the total market is served (adapted from the classic“Stackelberg” framework).
Proposition 1(a) describes the decisions of an integrated supply chain where the supplier
is managed essentially as a cost center. The results are an adaptation of those by Moorthy
(1984) for the case of a monopolist providing a single product. Proposition 1(b) iterates the
classic “Stackelberg” result, where the supplier sets the component price and reaps the ma-
jority of the supply chain profits (twice the amount of the OEM). The latter setting confirms
that, even when the quality is fixed to the optimal level of the integrated supply chain, the
total supply chain profits are lower than for the vertically integrated chain (the infamous
double marginalization effect). The loss is attributed to the self interest maximization of the
6This assumption ensures a “viable” (and more interesting from an analysis perspective) setting. Other-
wise none of the parties has an interest in pursuing the transaction; a quick calculation reveals that if the
supplier moves last in the game sequence, then s/he prices very high, squeezing out all the margin from the
OEM and prompting her to set p = q = 0.
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firms. We recite these results as benchmarks for the subsequent analysis and to acquaint the
reader with the main insights of the previous literature.
For the remainder of the paper, we focus exclusively on the non-integrated supply chain
setting. We categorize two distinct sequences of decisions in the product development pro-
cess: (i) the supplier(s) determines the component price w before the design specifications
are finalized (for example, gem prices in the diamond market determine to a large extent
the cost of the end refined jewels); (ii) the OEM(s) define the end-product design features
(architectural and design choices that determine the overall performance) before the com-
ponent price is set by the supplier market. Note, the decision sequence does not involve
which supply chain member sets the wholesale price, a sequence normally associated with
Stackelberg leadership in the marketing channels literature (Ingene and Parry, 2004). We
assume the supplier always sets the wholesale price for her component. Thus, the traditional
notion of a supply chain member becoming a Stackelberg leader or follower based on who
sets the wholesale price is ignored in our setting. Instead, we focus on the order of other
decisions made during the design process such as when the supplier should set her price or
when the OEM should share the specific product design with the supplier. Figure 1 depicts
the timely differences of the two decision sequences.



























Figure 1: Different sequences in end-product finalization
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Our categorization couples two important determinants of firm performance: the product
design choices (via the determination of the end-product performance quality) with the sup-
ply chain configurations (single versus multiple suppliers, and single versus multiple OEMs).
Through this structure we pursue the “3-D product development” decisions (Fine, 1998).
For notational ease, call the two sequences S and O (corresponding to the supply chain
member who makes the first transaction), defined respectively below:
Sequence S: Supplier sets component price→OEM finalizes design performance→OEM
sets price
Sequence O: OEM finalizes design performance→Supplier sets component price→OEM
sets price
For the remainder of this paper, we use the subscripts S and O to differentiate our
decision variables and parameter values between the two sequences although we drop the
subscript when convenient. The following Proposition offers the comparative results across
both decision sequences in the monopoly-supplier, monopoly-OEM setting.
Proposition 2 For j ∈ {S, O}, the optimal end-product quality q∗, price p∗ component price
w∗, total market sales D∗, supplier and OEM profits πS∗, πOEM∗, supplier profit premium and
total supply chain profit are higher in sequence j as follows:
Variable q∗ p∗ w∗ D∗ πS∗ πOEM∗ πS∗ − πOEM∗ πOEM∗ + πS∗ γ = πOEM∗
πS∗
Higher in sequence S S S O O S O O S
Proposition 2 reveals the opposing preferences across the two firms of the supply chain.
The supplier clearly prefers setting the wholesale price under full information with respect to
the design (i.e. she prefers sequence O), whereas the OEM benefits more from finalizing the
product quality only after the component price is determined (i.e. he prefers sequence S). At
first sight, the outcome is puzzling; both members of the supply chain benefit from decision
sequences that retract them from the power standpoint of the “first mover advantage.” Thus,
the supplier enjoys higher profit despite the fact that she gives up her first mover role, and
she charges less for each component (note that w∗S > w
∗
O). Sequence O is a straightforward
extension of the classic Stackelberg scenario: the member of the supply chain that sets the
wholesale price enjoys twice the profit over the other member (see the Appendix for the exact
solutions under each sequence). The supplier appropriates more of the total supply chain
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profits whereas the OEM has little control of the division of profits despite the fact that he
determines, through q, the size of the overall demand. Thus, in sequence O, when the OEM
chooses q, he determines the total supply chain profit but can not affect the percentage of
the total profit he enjoys. Once the demand curve is set (based on the OEM’s choice of
q), the decision sequence is exactly the same as the classic Stackelberg game described in
Proposition 1b and the supplier sets w to appropriate two thirds of the total supply chain
profit. The only lever available to the OEM lies in trying to induce a higher demand and
increase his profit. Therefore, he sets the performance quality and the price relatively low;
i.e. he pursues high volume but not high margins. The high volume strategy adopted by the
OEM, however, makes the supplier better off.
Interestingly, sequence S grants the supplier less power despite the fact that she operates
under a wholesale price leadership role. She is obliged to set the component price without
full knowledge of the demand curve, and as a result, the only lever for her to appropriate
higher profits is by ensuring a high margin (i.e. high w∗), even though the latter may
induce smaller demand (which it does, as attested by DS < DO). Concerning the OEM’s
strategy, sequence S grants him the ability to retain a higher share of the total supply chain
profits when compared with sequence O (still γS < 1 indicating that the supplier retains
the majority of the supply chain profit). Therefore, in contrast to sequence O, the OEM
pursues higher margins at the expense of lower volume. The extra percentage of the total
profits the OEM enjoys stems from the ability to set both the demand and the price under a
known component cost, thus reserving a higher profit. In a sense, the extra gain is a rent the
OEM appropriates due to full information, which dilutes the severity in the profit splitting
observed when double marginalization takes effect.
The “information rent” effect is also attested by the difference in the total supply chain
profits. Comparing the total profits of both sequences to the integrated supply chain’s profit
in Proposition 1a, there is a bigger drop in the total profit under sequence S where the
supplier determines the component price first. Thus, the supplier precommitment intensifies
the loss due to the double marginalization effect.
From a managerial standpoint, the results dictate a careful assessment of the ability to
integrate standardized components in the product design. Note that the issue of intellectual
property is at play here, since we assume a sole supplier without competition (probably
protected under patent enforcement), which permits the supplier to exploit the OEM. Yet,
the OEM may relax the severity of the total profit division losses by “locking” in the com-
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ponent prices before his design is finalized. Higher standardization in the end-product, as
proxied through the inclusion of the “off-the-shelf” component, seems to come at a social
cost however, as the inclusion of the independent supplier drives the end-product cost higher,
rendering the end market size smaller with fewer consumers served.
There is an additional interesting insight revealed from our analysis: the quality-quantity
trade-off in the social welfare. We explicitly state it in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Assume that the indifferent consumer between buying or not buying is of type
θj for sequence j ∈ {O,S}. There is a threshold consumer type θ̃ such that the individual
consumer preferences for each sequence are as follows:
Market segments (0, θO) (θO, θS) (θS, θ̃) (θ̃, 1)
Sequence with higher u(θ) None O O S
While sequence O results in a higher portion of the consumers satisfied (higher quantity),
a segment of the “very sensitive to quality” consumers obtains higher utility from sequence
S. Still, this high end segment, in combination with the higher quality offering (despite the





0 uO(θ)dθ), indicating that, on average, the consumers enjoy higher
utility under sequence S. This last result describes the impact on consumer utility. It reveals
that whereas sequence O satisfies more consumers, sequence S satisfies them better. In fact,
the high-end consumers benefit substantially from sequence S because it enforces a higher
quality product, thus providing them with more utility. This result does not directly translate
into an absolute preference for a sequence from a social welfare perspective. Answers to the
question “is providing more customers with a margin improvement in consumer utility better
than substantially increasing the utility of a few customers?” relates more to public policy
economics and is beyond the scope of our study.
5. The Role of Competition
In this section we depart from the base-case restriction of monopolistic markets in either the
upstream or the downstream industries in the supply chain. As we introduce competition
at the different tiers of the supply chain, we retain our focus on the timing of the product
definition.
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5.1 The case of upstream competition (OM case)
Assume the technology to produce the standardized upstream component is not subject to
IP restrictions, allowing its production by n supplier firms who compete in terms of their
capacity (“a la” Cournot). This underlying assumption finds immediate application in in-
dustrial settings where the upstream market supplies commodity raw products (e.g. silicon,
milk, corn, steel etc.) without low concentration, and it offers a reasonable approximation for
more general settings where there is mild competition (i.e. less harsh than Bertrand) at the
component tier of the supply chain7. As in the previous section, we categorize our analysis
with respect to the timing of the design decision. Sequence S represents industrial settings
where the supplier market, albeit competitive, determines the component price before the
performance and design quality decisions are made by the OEM. In sequence O the OEM
invests and finalizes the product design details prior to receiving a component price from the
suppliers. In such a setting, the OEM guarantees a major volume for the suppliers (approx-
imated through the monopoly downstream case), therefore he can proceed with the product
definition without a final upstream price; i.e. energy monopolies in European countries. As
before, the monopolist OEM chooses the quality offering q and the price p. The upstream
market supplies the common component at a market clearing price w. Assuming a market
clearing mechanism allows tractability while retaining the essential features of competition:
lower prices resulting from higher quantities of components. It also allows us to approximate
the competition intensity through the number of supplying firms. In the Appendix, we de-
rive the optimal decisions for general market structures (n = 2, 3, ...∞) but in the main text
we report on the opposite ends of the spectrum: in the presence of an upstream duopoly
and the perfect competition case with an extremely large (n →∞) number of suppliers. As
the number of suppliers approaches ∞, the results converge to the integrated supply chain
results of Proposition 1a, since the upstream market ends up competing solely on price.
Let
∑
πSi represent the sum of the suppliers’ profits for i = 2, ...n where n ∈ (2, 3, ...∞).
Proposition 4 compares the non-integrated supply chain’s optimal solutions for each variable
under the monopoly-supplier, monopoly-OEM (MM) setting versus the oligopoly-supplier,
monopoly-OEM setting (OM). These results are independent of the design sequence and of
the number of suppliers.
7Note that in the event the upstream competition is in prices the resulting optimal choices coincide with
the results of Proposition 1(a).
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Proposition 4 The presence of upstream competition introduces a unidirectional effect, in-
dependent of the timing of the product definition or the number of suppliers:






Larger under setting MM8 MM OM MM OM OM
As expected, the upstream competition alters the balance and shifts profits away from
the supplier market to the downstream monopolist OEM. The shift is unidirectionaly in-
dependent of the sequence for the component price, end-product price, and total demand
served. However, we show in the Appendix that the end product quality decreases (in order
to increase the overall sales) only in sequence S. Hence, the OEM is able to take advantage
of the supplier competition and reduce the quality only when the component price is set be-
forehand. This is a direct consequence of the information availability. In the event of setting
the product quality before knowing the component price (sequence O), the OEM retains the
same quality level as in the upstream monopoly case to ensure the suppliers do not exploit
the opportunity and retain their high prices. With respect to the double marginalization
effect, the total supply chain profit increases under the case of upstream competition. As
competition intensifies upstream (n →∞), the marginal profit on each component decreases
allowing the OEM to act as an integrated manufacturer.
Proposition 5 compares the effect of the product definition timing in the presence of
duopoly suppliers.
Proposition 5 For n = 2 and j ∈ {S, O}, the optimal end-product quality q∗, price p∗
component price w∗, market size D∗, supplier and OEM profits πS∗, πOEM∗, supplier profit
premium and total supply chain profit are higher in sequence j as follows:
Variable q∗ p∗ w∗ D∗
∑
πS∗i π
OEM∗ πOEM∗ −∑ πS∗i πOEM∗ +
∑
πS∗i γ
Higher in sequence S S O O O S S O S
Proposition 5 compares the quality offering, the social welfare, and the profits of the sup-
ply chain members, across the two sequences. Sequence O extends the original Stackelberg
framework for competitive suppliers. Under the presence of competition, the upstream mar-
ket is severely penalized as attested by Proposition 4. As expected, the OEM appropriates
the biggest share of the total supply chain profit under both sequences since he defines the
overall demand by setting q and, at the same time, enjoys lower prices due to the upstream
competition (for the detailed calculations please refer to the Appendix). As opposed to the
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monopoly-monopoly setting, things get even worse for the supplier market under sequence
S. Given that the competing suppliers face an unknown demand (no credible commitment
by the OEM), they intensify their competition under sequence S to ensure that, for any
potential demand curve, they will at least enjoy high sales volume (achieved through lower
component prices). The OEM on the other hand, experiences a lower component price under
sequence S without any commitment to set for the overall demand, hence he exploits the
resulting competition even more and obtains a higher rent appropriation, as the γ index
shows. Thus, the supplier market is better off under sequence O, exactly because they retain
the ability to determine the end-product price under a known and committed demand curve.
Again, the information availability benefits the second mover in the transaction.
From a managerial standpoint, our result confirms the observations about severe compe-
tition in generic “commoditized” component markets, such as the recent price competition
in the microprocessor market between Intel and AMD (Dunn, 2006). The result is also in
line with the conjectures of the technology management literature (Baldwin and Clark, 2000)
concerning the impact of different architectures (integratable versus modular) on the industry
structure. Modular architectures require standardized interfaces, rendering the component
markets more commoditized (since any upstream component is “good enough” as long as it
adheres to the interface standards), therefore they intensify within tier competition.
5.2 The case of downstream competition (MO case)
Our final case is a setting where a sole supplier offers a standardized component to two
competing OEMs that may differentiate their offering both in price and performance quality.
This supply chain structure represents industrial settings where the upstream market is
dominated by a single supplier (potentially holding law enforced patents on the component
technology), but the downstream market is competitive with respect to the preferences of
the end consumers. As in the previous cases, we explicitly consider the product definition
timing and distinguish between the two different sequences S and O. The OEMs choose the
quality offerings qi and the prices pi (i = 1, 2). The upstream supplier prices the component
used by both OEMs at w. We restrict the downstream competitors to two firms, due to the
intractability to obtain closed form solutions even for this simple case (this intractability is
not a peculiarity of our setting but a generally acclaimed difficulty; for more on this see the
original work by Moorthy 1988). Lemma 1 presents the end-product pricing as a function
of the competing quality levels and the supplier’s component price.
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Lemma 1 The end-product pricing equilibrium is






4q2−q1 if q2 > q1




4q1−q2 if q2 < q1
(1)
Through Lemma 1, it becomes apparent the two competing OEMs are obliged to dif-
ferentiate their products in terms of quality because in the event of the same quality, they
both make zero profit (they set their prices equal to their marginal cost, a well known result
of the Bertrand competition structure). Note also that the end-product pricing decisions
are independent of the sequence of decision making since the end-product price is chosen
last in both sequences. The Lemma indicates a separating equilibria where one firm chooses
a low quality and the other firm chooses a high quality (indicated by subscripts L and H
respectively). The existence of two symmetric equilibria follows directly from Moorthy 1988,
as the following Corollary states.








q∗1 = qL and q
∗
2 = qH (2)
As in the original work of Moorthy (1988), we derive the optimal quality levels numerically
for given values of the quality investment cost a. By minimizing the sum of the squared
differences, we determine the best fitting curves q1(a), q2(a) to the calculated numerical
values (results are provided in the Appendix). In Proposition 6, we compare the effect of the
decision sequence in the presence of duopoly OEMs. Then, in Proposition 7, we discuss the
effects of upstream versus downstream competition on the overall supply chain performance
and the social welfare.
Proposition 6 For two OEMs and j ∈ {S,O}, the optimal product performance qualities
q∗H,j, q
∗




L,j, the component price w
∗
j , the market
size D∗H,j, D
∗






L,j , the supplier profit premium



















Sequence S S S S S O O S S O O O
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Proposition 6 highlights the conflicting incentives across the competing OEMs. The low
quality OEM benefits more from sequence O where he defines his product quality before
knowing the supplier’s component price. In contrast, the high quality OEM prefers knowing
in advance the component price. The difference stems from a similar logic as in the duopoly
suppliers case. A predetermined component cost (sequence S) essentially restricts the overall
market by inflating the overall product costs. Thus, the component price determines the total
market size, increasing the competition among the OEMs trying to differentiate themselves
in a given market. With a smaller total market, the low quality OEM is obliged to increase
his quality and price to retain an acceptable level of profits, thus reducing his market size.
The severity of the competition among the OEMs is also attested by the magnitude of
the product differentiation (i.e. qH − qL), which is smaller in sequence S. This is also seen
through the total supply chain profits. Once competition intensifies, the total profit in the
supply chain declines. Note however, the different effect of the locus of competition on the
total supply chain profits: When the competition takes place in the supplier market, the
maximum total supply chain profits are attained under sequence S. Here, the same result is
achieved when the OEMs set their qualities first (sequence O). The underlying phenomenon
is the same although it manifests itself differently. In either case, when the competing parties
commit to their decisions with less information, the competition among them intensifies,
benefiting the other supply chain tier. In the second case (OEMs competing), higher intensity
implies that qualities are set higher and that fewer consumers buy, but at a higher margin.
Finally, due to the stronger OEM competition, sequence O results in higher total demand
DH + DL.
From the supplier’s perspective, her preferred choice of the design sequence changes
when there is competition at the OEM level. For the MM and OM cases, the supplier(s)
prefers full knowledge of the product design before setting the component price (sequence
O). With duopoly competition among the OEMs however (the MO case), she prefers to set
the component price before the OEMs set their qualities (sequence S). To see why, consider
the MM base case If the supplier moves first in this scenario, she must price the component
low so the OEM will invest in a large enough quality level and price the end-product low
enough to ensure sufficient demand. When there is competition at the OEM level however,
the OEMs already have an incentive to differentiate their products (through their price and
quality choices) as much as possible. Thus, the supplier can price the component higher
and still enjoy the benefits of large end-product demand. Thus, a volume-based strategy
18
becomes attractive.
The managerial take away once more emphasizes the component nature. Standardized
components with fixed prices render differentiation a less attractive “device” for profit appro-
priation, and the OEMs compete more intensively. Especially for components with patented
technologies, the impact on product differentiation results in social welfare loss, potentially
opening up market space for additional competitors (since a larger part of the total demand
remains unsatisified).
Proposition 7 compares the duopoly-supplier, monopoly-OEM structure with the monopoly-
supplier, duopoly-OEM structure.
Proposition 7 The component cost (w∗), the total demand served (D∗), and the total supply
chain profits are higher under the MO case than the OM case. These results hold under
both design sequences.
Proposition 7 compares the key indices across the two competition scenarios. When
compiled together, the results reveal an interesting insight: despite the fact that the end-
product demand increases (signaling lower on average prices) and the component price is
higher under the MO case, the total supply chain profits are also higher. The increase
is driven by the existence of vertical differentiation which allows the OEMs to retain (on
average) some of the value even though they pay higher prices to the monopoly-supplier
upstream. Thus, vertical differentiation downstream dilutes the upstream monopoly power,
allowing higher rent appropriation. From a social welfare standpoint, when components are
commodities but end-products are quality differentiated, it is better to allow monopolies at
the supplier level than at the OEM level (at least in terms of total demand served).
6. Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, we provide a normative perspective on earlier conjectures in the literature
about the potential interdependence between product design decisions and supply chain
transactions (Fine 1998). We consider the strategic interplay between the upstream supplier
market and the downstream end-product market given that (i) the end customers value qual-
ity heterogeneously, and (ii) the product design requires a standardized component to offer
complete functionality. In such a setting, the OEM(s) must decide on the product design
features by taking into account the entire product architecture (i.e. component sourcing, or
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IP component integration) and the timing of the associated decisions (before or after the
prices have been set for the components). There can be two possible times for this decision,
which we proxy through the sequence of actions taking place during our game theoretic
abstraction of the phenomenon. In the first sequence, the supplier market defines the com-
ponent price before the downstream firm(s) finalize the product design specifications (i.e.
the performance quality level) of the end-product. In the second sequence, the downstream
OEM(s) determines the product design details (through irreversible investments in product
development and resources) before the supplier market sets the component price.
The OEM’s choice of the end-product quality influences the resulting market potential
(and differentiates the product offerings in the case of competing OEMs) at a cost that is
increasing in the level of quality. The supplier’s choice of the component price influences the
OEM’s total marginal cost, and subsequently, the end-product price, thus indirectly deter-
mining the supplier’s demand. We explore how the timing of the product design definition
influences the component wholesale pricing, the product performance quality, the final sell-
ing price of the end-product, and profits for both the supplier, OEM, and the total supply
chain. We extend our analysis to account for competitive settings within the different tiers
in the supply chain.
From the outset, our model offers a comprehensive framework for identifying the interac-
tions between the product design definition and the transaction structure across the supply
chain tiers. To our knowledge, no other study has concurrently analyzed both design related
decisions and supply chain strategic interactions, the latter considered within and across
tiers. Still, as in any normative model, our results should be viewed with caution when
translating them into managerial actions. Our goal is not to offer a decision support system
but rather to provide directional insights as to the impact on specific decision variables.
We find the timing of the design definition affects the profits of the supply chain members
in managerially relevant ways. The standard notion of the decision “leader,” in the game
theoretic sense, does not always align with the payoff outcomes. Under a monopoly-supplier,
monopoly-OEM setting, the OEM benefits from defining the product quality before the com-
ponent price is set by the supplier. Symmetrically, the supplier prefers to finalize component
prices after the OEM’s design decisions and investments are set, thus also refraining from
a leader advantage. These timing preferences may change however, if there is competition
at either tier of the supply chain. Thus, in a monopoly-supplier, duopoly-OEM setting, the
supplier and the OEM producing the high quality product benefit more from fixed upfront
20
component prices, while the OEM producing the low-quality product prefers to finalize the
product performance as early as possible. Thus, the locus of competition in the supply chain
is strongly related to the timing of product definition. The results reflect the endogeneity
of the total market determination due to the product quality choice and the heterogenous
consumer preferences.
In addition, the classic double marginalization effect may be diluted under specific design
decision sequences. These sequences, however, do not always offer a “fairer” division of
profits. Finally, from a social welfare standpoint, we identify two important insights: (i)
Depending on the timing of the product finalization, more consumers may be served at a
lower average utility or less consumers may be served but at a higher average utility, and
(ii) In two-tier markets with the upstream market providing a standardized component, a
larger part of the total market is served when monopolies exist at the supplier tier instead
of the downstream end-product market.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) We write the payoff function of the integrated supply chain
as follows (for an integrated supply chain, the supplier’s price equals her cost which is
normalized to equal zero). The integrated firm decides with respect to the price for a given
quality level, thus let the consumer type that is indifferent between purchasing the end-
product or not be θ = p
q
(that stems from finding for a given (p, q) the consumer type θ such
that u(θ) = 0):
πOEM(q, p) = (1− p
q
)(p− aq2) (3)


























with only one solution that renders profits higher than zero for the integrated supply chain:
q = 1
3a
. Further substitution yields the rest of the values.
(b) Consider the two profit functions for a given level of quality q:
πOEM(p) = (1− p
q
)(p− aq2 − w)
πS = (1− p
q
)w
The supplier sets the wholesale price and the OEM decides on his pricing. Thus, we solve





q + aq2 + w
2
and subsequently

















Substitution back to the p(q, w) yields the optimal price and the rest of the results follows.
(QED)
Proof of Proposition 2. We analyze each one of the two configurations separately.
Hence, we solve each game structure backwards. The last stage (i.e. the OEM determines
the end-product price) is common across both configurations. The OEM maximizes her/his






(p− aq2 − w)dt = max
p
(1− θ)(p− aq2 − w) (5)
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w + q + aq2
2
, and πOEM∗(q, w) =
1
4
(aq2 + w − q)2
q
. (6)
Sequence S: Supplier’s price→OEM’s quality→OEM’s price. The choice of the optimal
performance quality offering q is determined by the maximization of πOEM∗(q, w). The












(1 + 12aw) + 6aw
9a
. (8)
The total quantity sold in the downstream market is


































Finally, the associated upstream market equilibrium maximizes the monopolistic supplier
































9The inequality ensures that the supplier benefits (even Paretto-wise) from supplying the end product
market.
10The profit function is concave in s ensuring that the maximum is unique, and given by the FOC.
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⇒ 4 + 8
√
7< 18 (13)















































































) = 1.753 1×10−2
a
Sequence O: OEM’s quality→Supplier’s price→OEM’s price. As in the previous se-
quence, the supplier maximizes her profit:
















q (aq − 1)2 . (16)
Finally, the OEM chooses the product quality performance. The choice of the optimal










































For comparison, we provide the results in a side-by-side layout.


































πS∗S − πOEM∗S = 7.88×10
−3
a




















Proof of Proposition 3. From the proof of Proposition 2 we find that
θS > θO (20)
which implies that the market size under decision sequence O is larger. Consider, then, the
resulting utility functions, i.e. uj(θ) = θq
∗











It is straight forward that for θ ∈ (θO, θS), only under sequence O do consumers enjoy a





' 0.91), such that uS(θ) > uO(θ) only if θ > θ̃. (QED)
Proof of Proposition 4. We proceed with the two distinct sequences as before.
Sequence S:.
The OEM’s optimal quality and price as a function of the suppliers’ price is the same as
in the monopoly-monopoly case and are thus given by (7) and (8) respectively. Differentia-
tion between the two supply chain models arises from the upstream competition. Since the
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suppliers are competing in quantities, the resulting analysis follows the steps of a non-linear









Thus, the demand is the same as in the monopoly-monopoly setting where DdownS is given by
(9). To determine the equilibrium quantities for each supplier, we need to define the inverse
demand function. Let ξ = 1 +
√




ξ(ξ − 2) (22)







(3 − ξ). Our transformation allows us to calculate the









Given the inverse demand function, each supplier maximizes her profit through
πSS,i(ki, K−i) = kiwS(K) = ki[
1
4a
(1− ki −K−i)(1− 3ki − 3K−i)] (25)
where K−i is the sum of the quantities set by the competitors (our assumption at this stage
is that the suppliers are competing in quantities; if instead they compete in prices then a
simple analysis shows that their prices would drive down to their cost and eventually the
OEM would set quality and price as in the integrated supply chain case). The first-order
condition determines the best response function:
1
4a
(1− ki −K−i)(1− 3ki − 3K−i) + ki[− 1
4a
(1− 3ki − 3K−i)− 3
4a
(1− ki −K−i)] = 0 (26)
which through algebra becomes
1
4a
(1− ki −K−i)(1− 3ki − 3K−i)− ki
4a
[4− 6ki − 6K−i] = 0. (27)
The latter provides (when solving for ki) the best response strategy of firm i, i.e. ki(K−i). We
assume symmetric competitors in the upstream supplier market, since we aim to study the
impact of the upstream industry on end-market quality and pricing. Henceforth, we obtain
the equilibrium quantities that determine the upstream prices. We proceed as follows: we
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substitute in the best response equation qi = q for every i = 1, 2, ..., n, and ki + K−i = nk to
get
(1− nk)(1− 3nk)− q(4− 6nk) = 0
3n(n + 2)k2 − 4(n + 1)k + 1 = 0.





16(n + 1)2 − 12n(n + 2)
6n(n + 2)
. (28)
Note the non-linear nature of the demand created by the monopolist OEM renders viable the





16(n + 1)2 − 12n(n + 2)
6(n + 2)
(29)
In order to specify whether any of the equilibria is likely to occur, we incorporate two
additional constraints in our calculations. First, the total quantity should be positive, K∗ ≥
0, otherwise the supplier market does not supply. Second, K∗ ≤ 1
3
, the total supplied
quantity should be small enough to ensure the component price is positive, w(K∗) ≥ 0, for
the suppliers to have positive profits. If we consider the solution
K∗S =
4(n + 1) +
√








(n + 1)2 + 3 ≤ 0 (31)










(n + 2n + 4)
3(n + 2)
(33)
To check our results, note that (32) reduces to K∗S = .15047 when n = 1 which is the same
as Ddown∗S in the monopoly-monopoly case.
11The specific polynomial has always two real roots, as verified by straightforward expansion (available
from the authors).
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For the duopoly case, substituting n = 2 into (32) gives K∗S = .21132. Substituting





. The optimal end-product quality and price and the OEM’s









, and πOEM∗S =
.01745
a










In the last stage the OEM chooses the appropriate pricing for the end-product. Provided
the end-product quality is q, and the component price supplied by the upstream market is





(p− aq2 − w)dt = max
p
(1− θ)(p− aq2 − w). (34)
Solving first order conditions results in the optimal price
pO(q, w) =
q + aq2 + w
2
. (35)
This price determines the marginal consumer to be: θ = q+aq
2+w
2q
and the total demand
Ddown = Dup = 1− θ, or
DdownO =
q − aq2 − w
2q
. (36)
Since we assume the upstream market is a Cournot competitive setting, we get
DdownO = K =




wO(K) = q − aq2 − 2qK. (38)
The latter formulation represents the inverse demand function of a typical Cournot linear
demand situation. Hence,
πSO,i = (q − aq2 − 2qK)ki (39)
where ki is the capacity produced by supplier i (i = 1, ..., n). The first order conditions
provide the best response function
ki(K−i) =
q − aq2 − 2qK
4q
(40)
where K−i is the total quantity produced by the competitors of the i-th supplier. Thus,













and the end-product price
p∗O(q) =





(n + 2)q + naq2
2(n + 1)
. (43)
The resulting OEM profit as a function of the quality is
πOEM∗O (q) = (1−
(n + 2)q + naq2
2q(n + 1)
)(
(n + 2)q + naq2
2(n + 1)




















Since the former renders the OEM zero profit, it is a non-desirable quality level. Thus, we
obtain a single solution, namely q∗O =
1
3a














For the duopoly case, n = 2, substituting q∗O =
1
3a
into ( 43) gives p∗O =
7
27a























n = 2 into (45) gives πOEM∗O =
4
243a
. A summary of the results from the two sequences is
presented in the Tables below:
Comparisons over sequence S :







































































Comparisons over sequence O :


































































































The proof follows from the previous results by comparison of the respective quantities
(QED).
Proof of Proposition 5. For comparison, we provide the results of the n = 2 case in a
side-by-side layout.




































































Proof of Lemma 1. Consider, independent of the sequence, the last stage of the game
where the two OEMs set their prices. It is immediately obvious that if the two OEMs have
set equal quality levels, q1 = q2, then the competition is a Bertrand competition, and the
optimal choices are to price at the marginal cost (pi = aq
2 + w) However, if this is not the
case, then we will get the market split into two “local” monopolies, with each OEM selling
to different sets of consumers. In that event the marginal consumers (i.e. the consumers
that are indifferent between buying or not, and the consumers that are indifferent between








The low quality firm chooses price p1 for a given exogenous quality q1 and the high quality
firm chooses price p2 for a given exogenous quality q2. Each firm i must pay aq
2
i , as well
as a per-unit cost for each component used of w. Note that the formulations above hold for
the case where q2 > q1. The symmetric setting has exactly the same structure, apart from
the variable indices that are swapped.




π2(p2|p1, q1, q2, w) =
∫ 1
θ2
(p2 − aq22 − w)dt = (1− θ2)(p2 − aq22 − w). (46)
and the low quality firm’s problem is
max
p1
π1(p1|p2, q1, q2, w) =
∫ θ2
θ1
(p1 − aq21 − w)dt = (θ2 − θ1)(p1 − aq21 − w). (47)
Solving the first order conditions simultaneously, results in the pricing equilibrium:
p2(q1, q2, w) = q2
2aq22 + 3w + 2q2 − 2q1 + aq21
4q2 − q1 ,
p1(q1, q2, w) =
2q2aq
2
1 + 2q2w + wq1 + q1aq
2
2 + q1q2 − q21
4q2 − q1 .
QED.
Proof of Proposition 6. The equilibrium profits are:
π̂OEM2 (·) =
(
2aq22 + q2q1a− 2q2 + w
) (






q2q1a + q1 − q21a− 2w
) (




q1 (4q2 − q1)2
.
(49)
We analyze the optimal component pricing by the monopolist supplier in the event of
sequence O. Recall that under this sequence the competing OEMs set their quality levels
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before the component price is determined. First, we determine how much the total quantity
of components that the supplier provides is. The total market is
Dq = (1− θ1) (50)
or in other words the total market depends fully on the marginal consumer that is indifferent
between purchasing and not. The quantity of the previous equation becomes

















4q2 − q1 q2 +
1
4q2 − q1 q1 −
2
(4q2 − q1) q1 q2w −
1
4q2 − q1w
Solving for the component price as a function of q1 and q2:
πS(·) = w[1− 2






4q2 − q1 q2 +
1
4q2 − q1 q1 −
2





3q2q1 − 2q21q2a− aq22q1 − 2q2w − wq1
(4q2 − q1) q1
]




3q2q1 − 2q21q2a− aq22q1
2q2 + q1
. (51)
The last optimization step involves the two OEMs’ quality decisions. The reaction func-
tions are calculated by substituting in the supplier’s optimal price into the OEMs’ profits:





2q1 − 8q22 − q2q1) (−8q32 + 7q22q1 + q21q2 + 8aq42 − aq32q1 − 7q21q22a) 1(2q2+q1)2(4q2−q1)2
πOEM1 (·) = (q2q1a + q1 − q21a− 2w) (aq22q1 + 2wq1 + q2q1 − q21 + q31a− 2q21q2a− 2q2w) q2 1q1(4q2−q1)2 =
(3aq22q1 + q
2
1q2a− q2q1 + q21 − q31a) (3aq32q1 − 2q21q22a + 2q21q2 − 2q31q2a− q22q1 − q31 + aq41) q2 1(2q2+q1)2q1(4q2−q1)2
As in the classic work of Moorthy (1988) these reaction functions do not have “mean-
ingful” closed form solutions. Hence, for further characterization of the optimal quality
levels and the degree of downstream differentiation we reside on numerical calculations, and
fit the curves qi(a) to the numerical results. The full results for the monopoly-supplier,
duopoly-OEM scenario are as follows:
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Proof of Proposition 7. Follows from the previous results by comparison of the re-
spective quantities (QED).
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